Causality, Conditionality, and Moral Responsibility in Buddhism

Causality, Conditionality, and Moral Responsibility in Buddhism

(Paraphrase of a section of the article BUDDHISM AND THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL:PALI AND MAHAYANIST RESPONSES by Nicholas F. Gier and Paul Kjellberg Freedom and Determinism: Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, eds., J. K. Campbell, D. Shier, M. O’Rourke (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), pp. 277-304.) 

In their analysis of Buddhist perspectives on free will and determinism, Nicholas F. Gier and Paul Kjellberg explore how Pali and Mahayanist traditions address these philosophical issues. They highlight that both traditions grapple with the interplay between freedom and determinism, yet they approach these concepts differently. The Pali tradition, with its emphasis on the principle of dependent origination, sees actions as interdependent rather than the result of an independent self. This view supports a form of moral responsibility grounded in intentionality rather than inherent free will. In contrast, Mahayanist thought, while also accepting the fundamental interconnectedness of events, introduces more nuanced views on the potential for achieving liberation and the role of individual agency within the broader cosmic order. Both traditions offer a rich dialogue on how personal agency operates within a framework of causal dependencies, challenging simplistic notions of absolute freedom or determinism.

By Dr. Nivitigala Sumitta (Bhante Sumitta)

In Buddhist thought, a distinction is made between Nirvana achieved at the end of existence and Nirvana experienced while still embodied, which can be equated with a state of contentment (sukha) similar to the Greek concept of eudaimonia. This state represents freedom from craving. According to Keith Lehrer’s analysis in this volume, Buddhists, like Lehrer’s example of a disciplined writer, act based on spiritual preferences rather than distracting desires, such as a craving for chocolate. Lehrer posits that “our preferences are the source of our freedom,” a view Buddhists would agree with. They recognize that we have the power to shape our preferences and, in turn, they shape us. Preferences, unlike involuntary desires, are consciously chosen.

For a Buddhist, succumbing to cravings perpetuates the cycles of existence, which is undesirable. Choosing spiritual practices like meditation aligns with the ultimate preference of Nirvana and freedom from Samsara. Buddhists are seen as agents of their preferences, not passive victims of their desires. Moreover, Buddhists are not burdened by the notion of an omnipotent deity influencing their choices, unlike in some theistic frameworks like those of Augustine and Luther. (Most Buddhists also do not grapple with neurophilosophers from Southern California dictating their preferences.)

Although Buddhism does not frame its teachings in terms of free will, it fundamentally embraces determinism: every effect has a cause. The concept of an uncaused or self-caused will contradicts the Buddhist principle of interdependent co-origination (pratītyasamutpāda), which holds that nothing in the universe originates from itself. Instead, Buddhist causality is viewed as a complex web of conditional relationships rather than simple cause-and-effect interactions. The Buddha taught that moral responsibility arises only from intentional actions, opposing the Jain view that accidental karma, such as unintentionally harming a bug, could impose moral blame. The Jains argued that only strict determinism could maintain objective ethical standards, a position the Buddha contested by arguing that such determinism would negate the possibility of liberation and moral responsibility.

The Buddha proposed that "freedom of the mind" operates through an understanding of how to counteract the causes of sorrow by developing equanimity and dispassion. He suggested that personal temperament and circumstances influence the outcomes of past causes, implying that causality is not strictly deterministic. The well-known analogy of a lump of salt illustrates this point: the impact of salt dissolving in a small cup of water versus a large lake shows that effects can vary depending on the context.

Pali Buddhist ethics can be described as contextual pragmatism, where understanding causation (pratītyasamutpāda) is essential to grasping the Dharma. This understanding is highly personal, involving a practical sense of what is fitting based on one’s circumstances. Mindfulness in Buddhism is about forming preferences that align with one’s needs and avoiding the extremes of excess or deficiency, similar to Aristotle’s concept of moderation.

Buddhist free agents are characterized by their awareness of the consequences of their actions on themselves and others. They are free from attachment to cravings and live within a balanced mean. Moral freedom, in this context, is the ability to align desires with one’s needs and circumstances, rather than possessing a self-determining power.

The Buddha viewed the craving for an independent self as a major source of bondage, ironically contrasting with the European philosophical belief that such self-determination is essential for true freedom. Instead, the concept of "situated autonomy" proposed by some modern political theorists resonates with Buddhist views on autonomy, where agents manage their cravings and act on their preferences within their context.

David Kalupahana describes Buddhist "conditionality" as a middle path between strict determinism and indeterminism, aligning with "soft" determinism. Buddhist conditionality suggests a complex network of conditions rather than straightforward causation. This view is akin to contemporary physics' concept of interdependent events rather than isolated causes.

Conditionality in Buddhism is summarized by formulas such as: “When this is present, that comes to be; from the arising of this, that arises. When this is absent, that does not come to be; on the cessation of this, that ceases.” The twelve-fold chain of conditionality, starting with ignorance and leading to rebirth, emphasizes that rebirth is contingent on various conditions, not predetermined by a single cause. This nuanced view of causality challenges modern science’s focus on predictive models by highlighting the complex, interconnected nature of events.

In summary, the Buddhist understanding of karma and moral responsibility is grounded in the recognition of a multitude of conditions affecting actions and outcomes, rather than a simplistic causal framework. This approach aligns with the view that actions motivated by positive intentions lead to favorable outcomes, while negative motivations result in suffering. The ripening of karmic actions reflects this interconnected web of conditionality in Buddhist ethics.

End Notes:

11. Samyutta Nikaya II.19-22, cited in Luis O. Gomez, “Some Aspects of Free-Will in the Nikayas,” Philosophy East and West 25:1 (1975), pp. 85-85.  I am indebted to Gomez for both texts and insights.

12. Majjhima-nikaya I.190-1, cited in Kalupahana, Buddhist Philosophy: A Historical Analysis (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1976), p. 64.  The pronoun has been changed to “they” to avoid the exclusive “he.”

13. See William Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991),  passim, p. 230 for a revised view of the self; and "Liberal Virtues and the Formation of Civic Character" in The Seedbeds of Virtue: Sources of Competence, Character, and Citizenship in American Society, eds. M. A. Glendon and D. Blankenhorn (Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 1995), pp. 35-60.  See Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990),  passim, pp. 220-221 for “situated autonomy.”

14. See Kalupahana, Buddhist Philosophy, chapter 3.

15. Ibid., p. 28.

16. R. H. Robinson and Willard L Johnson, The Buddhist Religion: A Historical Introduction (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1992), p. 17.

17. Edward Conze, Buddhist Thought in India (London: Allen & Unwin, 1962), p. 149.

Ibid.  The difference between abstract and concrete here can be explained with the distinction between rational or aesthetic order.  See N. F. Gier’s “Synthetic Reason, Aesthetic Order, and the Grammar of Virtue,” Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 18:4 (2001).

Ibid., p. 146 fn.

Bhikkhu Buddhadasa recorded a long tradition of a metaphorical interpretation of the realms of existence.  See Toward Truth, ed. Donald K. Swearer (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press, 1972).

I am indebted to Joseph Goldstein for this statement and this insightful way of redefining karma.  See his “Cause and Effect” in Radiant Mind: Essential Buddhist Teachings and Texts, ed. Jean Smith (New York: Riverhead Books, 1999), pp. 291.  The definition of karma as volitional action is not only good Pali Buddhism but it is also the position of the great Mahayanist philosopher Vasubandhu: “karma is will (cetana) and voluntary action (cetayita karanam)” (cited in Theodore Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism [New Delhi: Motilal Barnarsidass, 1974], p. 32).