Free Will as a Modernist Concept

Free Will as a Modernist Concept

By Dr. Nivitigala Sumitta (Bhante Sumitta)

(Paraphrase of a section of the article BUDDHISM AND THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL:PALI AND MAHAYANIST RESPONSES by Nicholas F. Gier and Paul Kjellberg Freedom and Determinism: Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, eds., J. K. Campbell, D. Shier, M. O’Rourke (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), pp. 277-304.) 

In their analysis of Buddhist perspectives on free will and determinism, Nicholas F. Gier and Paul Kjellberg explore how Pali and Mahayanist traditions address these philosophical issues. They highlight that both traditions grapple with the interplay between freedom and determinism, yet they approach these concepts differently. The Pali tradition, with its emphasis on the principle of dependent origination, sees actions as interdependent rather than the result of an independent self. This view supports a form of moral responsibility grounded in intentionality rather than inherent free will. In contrast, Mahayanist thought, while also accepting the fundamental interconnectedness of events, introduces more nuanced views on the potential for achieving liberation and the role of individual agency within the broader cosmic order. Both traditions offer a rich dialogue on how personal agency operates within a framework of causal dependencies, challenging simplistic notions of absolute freedom or determinism.

One reason Asian philosophers may not address the concept of free will as explored in contemporary debates is their focus on spiritual freedom rather than freedom of will. Thinkers from the Indian Subcontinent often prioritize a transcendental freedom that goes beyond the material realm of cause and effect. For these Indian yogis, karma and its limitations are seen as part of the cycle of existence until one achieves ultimate liberation, making the deterministic nature of karma less of an issue.

Hindu scriptures depict saints with extraordinary abilities and powers. For instance, the Taittiriya Upanishad describes the yogi as possessing "independent sovereignty" and experiencing a bliss far surpassing even the highest gods (1.6; 2.8). Similarly, the Maitri Upanishad portrays the ascetic as transcending Brahman and the gods (4.4), while the Shvetashvatara Upanishad describes yogis achieving feats like rolling up space (6.20). This view, termed "spiritual Titanism," involves humans acquiring divine attributes and powers.

In contrast, the Buddha dismissed these grand claims from Hindu and Jain yogis, particularly their assertions of omniscience. Although he acknowledged their view of divine subordination and the necessity of human reincarnation for liberation, the Buddha himself and his followers did not see themselves as divine beings. Instead, they pursued Nirvana within this world rather than in a supernatural realm. The Buddha viewed personal identity as embodied and did not see the senses or emotions as inherently evil. He distinguished between Nirvana achieved within the body and Nirvana at the end of existence cycles, and, as an empiricist, he chose not to speculate about the latter. However, the state of Nirvana experienced in life, defined as "freedom," will be analyzed in compatibilist terms in the third section.

The Buddha's indifference to the concept of free will may stem from a deeper philosophical reason shared by Greek and Roman thinkers and absent in Asian philosophies. This reason relates to the modernist division between the "inner" and the "outer" worlds, which creates a conflict between internal freedom and external causality.

Historical analysis suggests that the concept of free will, as understood in modern contexts, emerged in the writings of Augustine of Hippo, who paradoxically advocated for divine omnipotence and causality. Augustine's God, embodying absolute sovereignty, undermines the possibility of true free will. Medieval Christian philosophers, including Aquinas, struggled with this issue, and it was only with thinkers like William of Ockham that the notion of divine power leading to direct causation was explored. Unlike in Western thought, divine power and free will were less prominent concerns in Asian and Greco-Roman philosophies.

The challenge of divine omnipotence may have triggered the quest to understand human will and freedom, particularly in the context of medieval Christian thought. The evolution from medieval nominalism to the Reformation's radical fideism marked a shift, with faith returning to the inner world and reason advancing in empirical science. This period laid the groundwork for the modern philosophical dichotomy between reason and faith.

Modernism redefined the concept of subjectivity, prominently influenced by Descartes' Meditations, which established the thinking self as the primary subject of experience. This shift from viewing all things as subjects to considering them as objects in relation to the thinking subject reflects the emergence of modern objectivism and the mechanistic worldview, setting the stage for modern notions of otherness and alienation.

End Notes:

5.  Nicholas F. Gier, Spiritual Titanism: Indian, Chinese, and Western Perspectives (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2000).

6. One could say that the issue was first raised by the Stoics, who criticized Epicurus’ attempt to introduce indeterminism among the atoms, but what is entirely missing from Greco-Roman philosophy is the concept of a fully self-determining will.  Furthermore, Epicurus’ indeterminism is no more successful in addressing free-will than those who would now want to appeal to Heisenberg’s indeterminacy principle.  Finally, it is clear that modernist concepts such as autonomy and the separation of fact and value were indeed anticipated and affirmed by some ancient schools of thought, such as Sankhya-Yoga, Jainism, Indian and Greek atomism, and Chinese Mohism.

7. For example, see H. Hudson, “Wittgenstein and Zen Buddhism,” Philosophy East and West 23:4 (October, 1973), pp. 4471-482; “Wittgenstein and Nagarjuna,” Philosophy East and West 35:2 (April, 1985), pp. 157-170; Chris Gudmunsen, Wittgenstein and Buddhism (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1977); Paul Wienpahl, “Eastern Buddhism and Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations,” pp. 22-54; and Nathan Katz, “Nagarjuna and Wittgenstein on Error” in Buddhist and Western Philosophy, ed. Nathan Katz (Atlantic Heights, NJ: Humanities Press, 1983), pp. 306-327.

8.  See Nicholas F. Gier, “Three Types of Divine Power,” Process Studies 20:4 (Winter, 1991), pp. 221-232.